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Abstract
Money and Liquidity in Financial Markets
We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the
broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness
in the interbank market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity
pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered
investors. Empirical tests support this hypothesis. While our data covers part of the
recent crisis period, our results are not driven by the crisis. Our general point is that
money matters in financial markets. Different financial assets have different degrees of
moneyness (liquidity) and, as a result, there are systematic cross-sectional variations in
trading activity as the price of liquidity, or the level of tightness, in the interbank market
fluctuates.
Keywords: money, liquidity, interbank and financial markets, liquidity pull-back
JEL: G12, G21, E41, E44, E51
– All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full: unto the place from whence the
rivers come, thither they return again.
Ecclesiastes 1:7
1 Introduction
We study the connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader finan-
cial markets. That such a connection exists is suggested, for example, by the experience
of the recent financial crisis, where we saw both a breakdown in the interbank market and
a collapse in the prices of financial assets. There is also evidence in the extant literature
that financial markets are affected by monetary phenomena. For example, returns in bond
and equity markets appear to be influenced by monetary shocks (Fleming and Remolona
1997, Fair 2002, Piazzesi 2005) and fund flows (Edelen and Warner 2001, Boyer and Zheng
2009, Goetzmann and Massa 2002), as are measures of liquidity in these markets (Chordia,
Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2005). However, we are not aware of research that explicitly
documents a link between the interbank market and the broader financial markets, as we
do in this paper.
Our motivation for this line of inquiry has its basis in a money and banking perspective
on financial market activity. Banks need liquidity, or central bank money, to satisfy reserve
requirements, allow depositor withdrawals, etc. The central bank determines the quantity
of liquidity via its operations and then the interbank market (re)allocates it. However, if
the price of liquidity in the interbank market is high, alternative sources of liquidity may
be more attractive. Banks that have exhausted credit limits, must look for alternative
sources. But to paraphrase Friedman (1970), “One bank can increase its money balances
only by persuading another one to decrease its balances.”1 And as emphasized by Tobin
(1980), “The nominal supply of money is something to which the economy must adapt,
1The original Friedman quote is: “One man can reduce his nominal money balances only by persuading
someone else to increase his. The community as a whole cannot in general spend more than it receives.”
1
not a variable that adapts itself to the economy – unless the policy authorities want it to.”
So what alternatives to the interbank market are there?
Banks have, in fact, several alternatives. They can go to the discount window, but this
is expensive and a last resort. They can try to induce more deposits, but this is unlikely to
be effective within a short time span. Rather, the alternative that we wish to emphasize
here, is selling financial assets and/or increasing margins to investors, which in turn may
lead to asset sales as investors seek to meet margin requirements.2 This does not increase
the quantity of liquidity in the system, but it can increase the selling bank’s liquidity
balances, as long as the buying counterparty banks with another bank. One can think
of this as a kind of “liquidity pull-back,” where a bank dips its ladle into the “ocean” of
financial assets and recovers, for itself, liquidity granted to a counterparty some time in
the past and stored all the while in the financial asset that now is being sold.
Thus, we argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity
and the broader financial markets arising from (the possibility of) liquidity pull-back.
There are two potential facets to this connection. First, a higher price of liquidity, ceteris
paribus, should be associated with offsetting drops in asset prices. This is so as to equalize,
insofar as possible, the cost of acquiring liquidity directly in the interbank market versus
acquiring it indirectly by selling assets in the financial markets. The other facet of the
connection relates to the volume of trade. This will be the main focus of our empirical
analysis and to which we now turn.
Liquidity pull-back trading is arguably most likely to occur if the interbank market is
not allocatively efficient. The crisis is an example of it being so; volume in the interbank
market fell (Cassola, Holthausen, and Lo Duca, 2008) while central banks around the
world injected vast amounts of liquidity to counteract banks’ unwillingness to lend to each
other. In addition, Bindseil, Nyborg, and Strebulaev (2009) find evidence that there is a
degree of allocational inefficiency in the interbank market even during what we think of
as times of normalcy, and Fecht, Nyborg, and Rocholl (2008) find evidence that interbank
2Kashyap and Stein (2000) document that many banks hold substantial amounts of securities.
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liquidity networks, which are intended to overcome imperfections in the interbank market,
are not always effective.
Thus, we expect increased tightening in the interbank market to give rise to an increased
volume of liquidity pull-back trading. To test this idea, we focus on the cross-sectional
implications. In particular, the liquidity pull-back effect on volume should be felt differen-
tially across assets, depending on their degree of liquidity in the financial economics sense
of the word. By definition, trade in a highly liquid asset involves lower price impact, or
transaction costs, on average than an equivalent trade in a less liquid asset (Black 1971,
Kyle 1985). The implication, and our central hypothesis, is thus that increased tightness
in the interbank market for liquidity is associated with an increase in the volume of more
liquid assets relative to that of less liquid assets.
From the perspective advanced in this paper, selling a financial asset can be thought of
as an act of converting low powered money (financial assets) into higher powered money
(liquidity). When the price of liquidity goes up, the price of conversion also rises and asset
prices therefore fall. However, with respect to this price effect, we expect no differential
impact across assets of different liquidity levels, since in equilibrium there should be an
equalization across assets of the marginal costs of converting into higher powered money.
We test these hypotheses on the CRSP universe of stocks using the three month Libor-
OIS and TED spreads as measures of tightness in the interbank market.3 The Libor-OIS
spread may be a more precise measure of the state of the interbank market, since it is
the difference between two interbank rates, rather than an interbank and a treasury rate.
However, we have a longer time series of the TED spread. The in-sample correlation
between the two spreads is .92. While one might think that liquidity-pull back may be
more prevalent in the Treasury security or broader fixed income markets, testing our
hypotheses using the CRSP universe of stocks offers several advantages. First, the data is
reliable and of high quality. Second, there are thousands of stocks, with a wide range of
3Libor is London Interbank Offered Rate, OIS is overnight index swap, TED spread is 3 month Libor
less the 3 month treasury bill rate.
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liquidity levels. Third, there is homogeneity in trading infrastructure.
The empirical design involves forming portfolios of stocks based on the Amihud (2002)
price impact measure of liquidity. Our predictions are confirmed in the data: First, the
market share of volume of highly liquid stocks is increasing in either spread; second, the
difference in portfolio returns between high and low spread days is negative, but the size
of the difference does not depend on the degree of liquidity of the portfolio.
While we use it as a general measure of tightness in the interbank market, the Libor-
OIS spread can be viewed more specifically as a measure of the price of liquidity. A “Libor
transaction” gives the borrower a fixed quantity of liquidity for a fixed period of time. The
alternative (in the unsecured end of the market) is borrowing overnight and hedging the
interest rate risk using the OIS. But this entails quantity risk; a bank cannot be sure that it
will get the desired quantity of liquidity every day over the next three months, say.4 While
the spread thus captures the extra cost of having the liquidity for sure, we believe it also
reflects at least an element of the quantity constraints inherent in our concept of interbank
market tightness. The drop in interbank activity during the crisis (especially at the longer
end) supports this view. In addition, Gorton and Metrick (2009) find that high Libor-OIS
spreads coincide with increased haircuts in repos. From a theoretical perspective, standard
Akerlof (1970) adverse selection reasoning yields a positive relation between the price of
liquidity and unsatiated demand.5 Thus, the Libor-OIS spread may be viewed as a general
measure of interbank tightness as well as a specific measure of the price of liquidity.
The empirical analysis in this paper is motivated by the theoretical framework sketched
above. A less bank-centric line of reasoning that is consistent with our findings is as
follows: Higher spreads imply higher funding costs for investors, as banks pass on their
own borrowing costs. As a result, stock prices fall. In turn, this leads to margin calls and
4There is also some interest rate risk, since a bank’s overnight borrowing costs will not necessarily be
equal to or perfectly correlated with the floating rate that inputs into the OIS contract, for example since
overnight rates may vary across banks.
5Adverse selection may also lead to credit rationing along the lines of Jaffee and Russell (1976) or
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
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portfolio rebalancing, as already described. This still implies a connection between the
interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, but the role of banks
is deemphasized. Our perspective differs from that of Grossman and Miller (1988) and
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), where selling pressure originates in the asset market
rather than the money market. Brunnermeier and Pedersen in particular emphasize how
a liquidity event in the asset market can lead to dramatic falls in prices, as providers of
funding liquidity may tighten margins too much if they are uninformed about the cause
of the liquidity event. In our framework, a severe decline in stock prices could potentially
be triggered by unrest in the interbank market, for example arising from extreme adverse
selection in that market. Both of these perspectives may well be relevant for understanding
the collapse in the stock markets during the crisis.
This paper is related to several other literatures. Liquidity pull-back trading is a
potential explanation for the commonality in liquidity found by Chordia, Subrahmanyam,
and Roll (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka (2001). We also
contribute to the literature on trading volume (e.g. Ying 1966, Karpoff 1987, Lo and Wang
2000, Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam 2007) by documenting that the Libor-OIS and
TED spreads are associated with cross-sectional variations in volume.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data sources and
section 3 provides descriptive statistics. Section 4 examines volume and returns on high
and low spread days for different levels of illiquidity. Section 5 performs further regression
analyses. Section 6 examines robustness to the set of sample firms, and section 7 concludes.
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2 Data
2.1 Spreads
In this paper, the Libor-OIS spread refers to the difference between 3 month USD Libor
and the 3 month USD overnight index swap rate.6 Libor is collected daily over the period
2nd January 1986 to 31st December 2008. This yields a total of 5,817 Libor observations.
The OIS data are also daily, but only cover the period from 4th December 2001 to 11th
November 2008. Thus, we have 1,716 daily observations of the Libor-OIS spread.
The TED spread is defined as the difference between the 3 month USD Libor rate
and the 3 month T-Bill rate.7 The T-Bill data is available for the entire period for which
we have Libor data. But on some days we only have one or the other rate, for example
because bank holidays in the U.K. may fall on different days than U.S. holidays. Thus,
we have 5,648 daily observations of the TED spread.
2.2 Volume and Returns
The stock market data comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We
consider stocks that are listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX over the period 1986 to
2008, with CRSP share codes 10 or 11. Thus, we exclude ADRs, closed-end funds, REITs,
and shares of firms incorporated outside of the U.S. We also exclude financials by removing
firms with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999. Stocks
that meet any of the following criteria at any time within a given year are also removed
for that year: the stock price exceeds $999 or the firm changes ticker, cusip, or exchange.
This leaves us with an average of 4,506 individual stocks per day. The change in exchange
removal criterion is used to minimize the impact that any market microstructure changes
might have on the stock. In a later section, we also examine the robustness of our findings
by removing all NASDAQ stocks.
6Libor is downloaded from http://www.bbalibor.com. The OIS rate is obtained from Reuters.
7The T-Bill data is obtained from http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm.
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3 Overview and Descriptive Statistics
This section provides an overview of some of the key inputs to our subsequent analysis,
namely the Libor-OIS and TED spreads, measures of liquidity
3.1 Spreads: The Price of Liquidity
Figure 1 displays the Libor-OIS spread (in basis points, bp) over the period 4 December
2001 to 11 November 2008. The red (shaded dark) section of the graph represent the
recent financial crisis.8 Figure 2 superimposes the TED spread on Figure 1. The reactions
of the two spreads to the subprime crisis are seen to be similar. They fluctuated at low
levels until August 2007, when they simultaneously increased sharply. Pre-crisis there is
a slight upward trend in the TED spread, while there is a slight downward trend in the
Libor-OIS spread. The correlation between the two spreads is 92%.
Figure 3 displays the TED spread from 1986 to 2008. Crises are indicated in red (dark
shading). There are several of these, e.g., the crash in October 1987 (Black Monday), the
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Russian financial crisis and the collapse of Long
Term Capital Management (LTCM) at the end of 1998.9 We see that the price of liquidity,
as measured by the TED spread, is typically at elevated levels when there is significant
uncertainty, such as during a war or a financial crisis.
Table 1 confirms that the spreads are statistically significantly higher during crises
than during normal times. For the TED spread, the non-crisis versus crisis means are,
respectively, 48.47 bp and 105.37 bp. For the Libor-OIS spreads, they are 11.34 bp and
67.37. Both spreads reached their peak on the 10th of October 2008, when the TED and
8Figure 1 indicates the crisis as starting in February 2007, which is when the first public signs
of problems started to emerge. See, for example, BBC News, “Timeline: Sub-prime losses” on
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7096845.stm. Many commentators identify the beginning of the
crisis with the second week of August 2007, when the Libor-OIS spread more than doubled. The exact
beginning of the crisis is not important for the purpose of this paper.
9See the notes for Figure 3 in the appendix for details.
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Libor-OIS spreads stood at 456.88 bp and 366.33 bp, respectively. The extreme magnitude
of these numbers can be seen from the fact that they are equivalent to an increase by a
factor of 9 and 8 standard deviations relative to the respective unconditional means, or,
in terms of raw numbers, by a factor of 8 and 14 times.
There appears to be an association between interbank tightness and asset prices. For
example, the recent crisis saw not only high spreads, but also declining asset prices. From
1 August 2007 to 31 March 2009, the S&P 500 fell by 46% and, in local currency, the DAX,
NIKKEI, and the FTSE 100 fell by 45%, 52%, and 37%, respectively. The other major
financial crisis in our sample is the stock market crash of October 1987 (Black Monday).
Roll (1988) notes that 19 out of 23 markets declined by more than 20 percent that month.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the TED spread also spiked at this time. In October 1987,
the TED spread had an average value of 195.2 bp, as compared with average values for
September and August of 96.8 and 81.8 bp, respectively. This coincidence of extreme
tightness in the market for liquidity and extreme falls in stock prices is suggestive of there
being a link between the markets for liquidity and stocks. More scientific evidence that
the TED spread affects stock market returns is provided by Ferson and Harvey (1993).
Our focus in this paper, however, is on testing the liquidity pull-back hypothesis by
examining the effect of tightness in the interbank market on cross-sectional variations
in volume. The figures and summary statistics above illustrate that there is substantial
time variation in the price of liquidity, either as measured by the Libor-OIS spread or the
TED spread. While much of this variation is due to crisis periods, there is also a fair
amount of variation during non-crisis times. The coefficient of variation during non-crisis
times is 0.67 and 0.32 for the TED and Libor-OIS spread, respectively. Chordia, Roll
and Subrahmanyam (2001) document that there are day of the week and holiday effects
in aggregate dollar volume. However, as seen in Table 1, there are no such effects in the
Libor-OIS and TED spreads. This is important because it means that our findings below
which relate variations in these spreads to the relative volume of stocks with different levels
of illiquidity are not driven by systematic day of the week effects.
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3.2 Illiquidity
To test the hypothesis that the volume of liquid and illiquid stocks respond differently to
the price of liquidity we need a measure of the liquidity of stocks. Goyenko, Holden and
Trczinka (2009) show that low-frequency measures of liquidity based on daily data perform
well as compared with high frequency intraday measures. Low frequency measures have
the advantage of being computable for a larger range of stocks over longer time horizons
than measures based on intraday data. Among low frequency price impact measures, the
best performer is Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ, which we therefore employ in this paper.
We measure ILLIQ on a monthly basis. For stock i and month j, ILLIQ is defined as:
ILLIQij = Average
(
|rt|
Volume t
)
(1)
where, |rt| and V olumet are the absolute value of the stock’s rate of return and dollar
volume, respectively, on day t. Thus, a large ILLIQ is indicative of a highly illiquid stock,
since price impact per unit of volume is large. The average in (1) is taken across observa-
tions for stock i in month j where recorded volume is positive. We exclude observations
with no recorded closing price on either day t or day t− 1 and a zero return on day t, as
this is highly suggestive of stale prices and spurious volume.10 This exclusion results in a
loss of less than 2% of monthly ILLIQ observations.
Throughout the paper, we work with portfolios sorted by ILLIQ on a monthly basis.
In particular, each month stocks are sorted into 10 groups based on their ILLIQ for that
month. Group 1 consists of the month’s 10% most liquid stocks, i.e., the stocks with the
lowest ILLIQ, Group 2 consists of the next 10% most liquid stocks, etc. Table 2 examines
the month-to-month stability of the groups, by providing month-by-month transition fre-
quencies from one group to another. Not surprisingly, the more liquid and illiquid groups
10In the CRSP database, all days without a recorded closing price are given a “closing” price of the
bid/ask average and this situation is flagged by the use of negative numbers. There are occurrences in
the database where there is no recorded closing price, thus suggesting an absence of trade, yet there is
positive recorded volume.
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are more stable than the groups in the middle. For groups 1, 5, and 10, the proportion of
stocks that remain in the group the next month is 89.88%, 48.46%, and 72.90%, respec-
tively. In all of our analysis, for example when examining the impact of the Libor-OIS
spread on volume across different liquidity groups, we work with liquidity groups based
on the previous month’s ILLIQ s.
Table 3, Panel A, provides descriptive statistics of individual stock’s monthly ILLIQ.
The pooled sample mean is 17.63 (median 0.134). By way of comparison, Goyenko et al.
(2009) report a mean of 6.31 (median 0.104).11 Thus, the stocks in our sample are more
illiquid than those in Goyenko et al.’s sample. Potential reasons for this difference include:
(i) Goyenko et al. require their sample firms to be present in the TAQ master file (because
of their objective to compare the performance of high and low frequency measures), which
we do not. (ii) They consider the time period 1993 to 2005 while we consider 1986 to 2008.
(iii) They consider a random sample of 400 firms, while we use the entire CRSP database.
Both our and their estimates can be viewed as being large; a volume of 1 million dollars
implies a price change of 13.4% for the median firm in our sample and 10.4% in Goyenko
et al.’s sample. However, for the most part, we only use stocks’ ILLIQ values to classify
them into groups. For our purposes, it is the ordinal, not cardinal, accuracy of ILLIQ that
matters.12
Panel B provides descriptive statistics of the average ILLIQ within groups. There is
substantial variation across groups. The average ILLIQ is 0.001 for Group 1 and 162.601
for Group 10.
11These numbers refer to the plain (or raw) ILLIQ multiplied by 1,000,000. That is to say, volume is
measured in millions.
12If cardinal accuracy is important, it may be advisable to use an Acharya and Pedersen (2005) style
truncation of ILLIQ in order to reduce the impact of extreme observations. In this paper, this is an issue
only for the regressions in Table 8. Footnote 16 discusses this further.
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3.3 Volume and Returns
Our analysis of volume in this paper revolves around four measures of normalized and
relative volume.
1. For each stock or illiquidity group i and day t, we calculate:
normalized share volumei,t =
Volumei,t
Average volume for i over the previous five days
,
where volume is the number of shares traded.
2. normalized dollar volumei,t.
This is defined the same way as normalized share volume, but with volume now being
the dollar value of trades. The two normalized volume measures capture abnormal
volume on a given day in a simple way.
3. For each pair of illiquidity groups, X and Y , we calculate their relative volume on
day t as:
Relative Volume of Group X to Group Y t =
Volume Group X
t
Volume Group Y
t
,
where volume is measured in dollars.
4. For each illiquidity group G, we calculate its market share of volume on day t as:
Market Share of Volume Group Gt =
Volume Group Gt
Aggregate volumet across all stocks in the sample
,
where volume is measured in dollars.
To get a sense of the typical magnitudes of these variables, Panel C of Table 3 provides
some summary statistics. First, for each day we calculate the normalized share volume for
each individual stock and then take their equally weighted average, thus obtaining a series
of daily observations of what we call the market normalized share volume. The market
normalized dollar volume is calculated analogously. The averages of these two measures
are 1.007 (share) and 1.009 (dollar). In other words, for a typical stock, share (dollar)
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volume increases by approximately 0.7% (0.9%) per day. But there is significant variation
over time. On one occasion, the market normalized share volume is 2.318, which translates
into 231.8%. This coincided with a value-weighted market return of 3.3% and occurred on
17 January 1991, which was close to the liberation of Kuwait. Market normalized share
and dollar volumes reach their minimum values (a reduction in volume of roughly 70%)
around Christmas (24th and 26th of December), Thanksgiving (end of November), and the
4th of July.
Panel C also provides summary statistics for the relative volume of Group 10 to Group
1, reported in per mille13. The daily mean is 0.43 per mille. The large fluctuation in the
relative volume between these two extreme groups is illustrated by the range of 0.033 to
29.03 per mille. We also see that the mean Market Share of Volume for Group 1 is 78.6%,
with the range going from 56.4% to 91.5%.
Finally, with respect to returns, the equally and value weighted daily market returns
are 0.079% and 0.042%, respectively. In terms of value weighted returns, the largest drop
on a single day is -17.135%, which occurred on Black Monday, 19 October 1987. The
largest daily gain is 11.518% (13 October of 2008).
3.4 Correlations
Table 4 presents correlations among the volume and return variables from Panel C, Table 3
as well as the Libor-OIS and TED spreads. We have also included two-day volume and
return measures, e.g. the average market normalized share return over day t and t+1 etc.
The correlation structure has three noteworthy features.
First, the correlation between the spreads and market normalized share and dollar
volume range from -0.02 to 0.02. Thus, variations in the price of liquidity are not associated
with abnormal volume in the market as a whole.
However (and second), it is associated with systematic variation in volume cross-
13In other words, the “raw” relative volume is multiplied by 103 .
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sectionally. The correlation between the Libor-OIS and TED spreads and the Relative
Volume of Group 10 to Group 1 are -0.11 and -0.09, respectively. In other words, a higher
price of liquidity coincides with relatively more trade in liquid stocks. This can also be
seen from the positive correlation between the Market Share of Volume of Group 1 and
the spreads.
Third, the correlation between the Libor-OIS spread and the contemporaneous equally
and value weighted market returns are -0.17 and -0.13, respectively. The correlations be-
tween the TED spread and market returns are also negative. This mirrors the observation
above that the price of liquidity is often large when markets experience downturns.
These findings are in line with the theoretical framework laid out in the introduction
and, in particular, with the predictions of the liquidity pull-back hypothesis. Below, we
investigate the relation between the price of liquidity and the volume and returns of stocks
with different liquidity levels in more detail.
4 Volume and Return on High vs. Low Spread Days
According to the liquidity pull-back hypothesis, the volume of highly liquid stocks relative
to that of illiquid stocks goes up as the interbank market gets more tight. Prices are also
predicted to fall for liquid stocks as well as for illiquid stocks, though not differentially so.
To examine this, in this section we divide days of the month into high and low Libor-OIS
and TED spread days. We then compare normalized share and dollar volumes as well as
returns across liquidity groups on high versus low spread days. The idea is that if there is
a liquidity pull-back effect, it should be visible on extreme spread days.
We proceed, separately for the Libor-OIS and TED spreads, as follows: For each month
we: (i) select the two days with the highest and the two days with the lowest spreads; and
(ii) average the values of the spread and any other variable that we are interested in, such
as normalized share volume, on the two high as well as the two low spread days. In this
way, for each variable of interest we generate two time series with monthly observations,
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corresponding to the variable’s within-month average value on high and low spread days,
respectively.14 Since each month in the sample period contributes equally to any statistic
we calculate, this procedure controls for changes in the level of the spreads over time (e.g.
crisis versus non-crisis periods).
Table 5 contains summary statistics of the monthly times series of the Libor-OIS and
TED spreads on their respective monthly high and low days. These are significantly
different, both in an economic and statistical sense. For the Libor-OIS spread, the average
high and low days are 33.03 bp and 21.69 bp. For the TED spread, they are 70.11 bp and
43.14 bp. Over the period for which we have Libor-OIS spread data, the high and low
TED spread series average to 62.31 bp and 38.88 bp.
With respect to volume and return variables, we create separate series, on high and
low spread days as described above, for all ten illiquidity groups.15 The variables we track
are: normalized share volume, normalized dollar volume, the average of normalized share
volume on day t (the high or low spread day) and day t + 1, the average of normalized
dollar volume on day t and day t + 1, the equally weighted return across stocks in the
group, and the equally weighted return across stocks in the group on day t and t + 1.
The volume variables are calculated for the group as a whole (i.e. not averaged across the
stocks in the group).
14For a given month and spread, if there are more than two highest spread days, then all of those days
are weighted equally when calculating the monthly values of the variables we are looking at. If there is
a single highest spread day but several second highest spread days, then the latter are weighted equally.
For example, if four days have the second highest spread for a particular month then, for that month,
each of these four days represent one fourth of a high spread day. For a given variable (e.g. normalized
share volume), the monthly observation of the high spread day is then 0.5 times the variable’s value on the
unique high spread day plus 0.5 times the average value on the second highest spread days. We proceed
in the analogous way for low spread days.
15The groups are formed a month in advance. That is, the volume and return variables are estimated
using data from the current month, while groups are based on the previous month’s ILLIQs.
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4.1 Initial Results
Table 6, Panel A, reports average values of the selected variables on high and low Libor-
OIS spread days for each illiquidity group. There is a marked difference in the behavior of
the volume variables for liquid and illiquid stocks. For example, on low spread days, the
most illiquid stocks (Group 10) have a normalized share (dollar) volume of 1.090 (1.154)
versus 0.999 (1.006) for the most liquid stocks. Put differently, the most illiquid stocks
have an abnormally large volume of 9% in terms of the number of shares traded on low
spread days, while no effect is seen for the most liquid stocks. The difference is significant,
both economically and statistically.
On high Libor-OIS spread days, the most liquid stocks experience an increase in share
(dollar) volume of 5.8% (5.4%) relative to the average over the previous five days. The
most illiquid stocks see a drop of 6.7% (7.8%). As reported in the table, a means test shows
that the difference is statistically significant, having a t-statistic of 3.76 (2.95). Consistent
with the liquidity pull-back hypothesis, this shows that volume is abnormally high (low)
for highly liquid (illiquid) stocks on days when the price of liquidity is especially large.
In terms of returns, we see (not surprisingly) that illiquid stocks offer higher returns
overall. More importantly with respect to the liquidity pull-back hypothesis, we also see
that returns are uniformly smaller on high spread days.
Panel B reports on a similar exercise for the TED spread. The results parallel those
for the Libor-OIS spread.
Table 7 reports on the differences in values between high and low spread days of the
same volume and return variables as in Table 6. Panel A is based on the Libor-OIS and
Panel B on the TED spread. Consistent with the liquidity pull-back hypothesis, for all four
normalized volume measures and for each spread, the difference in volume between high
and low spread days is decreasing in illiquidity, albeit not monotonically. For example,
the differences in normalized share volume between high and low Libor-OIS spread days
is 5.9% for Group 1 and -15.7% for Group 10. Thus, as we go from low to high spread
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days, the abnormal volume for the most liquid stocks increases by a statistically significant
21.6% relative to that of the most illiquid stock. For the normalized dollar volume, the
difference is even larger. These findings support the liquidity pull-back hypothesis.
Our theoretical framework also says that while returns should be lower on high spread
days, the magnitude of the change should be similar for stocks with different liquidity
levels. This is confirmed in Table 7. For each illiquidity group, returns are lower on high
spread days. But in terms of the change in return from low to high spread days, there is
no statistically significant difference between groups 1 and 10. This is so whether we base
our analysis on the Libor-OIS or the TED spreads.
These initial results support the view that high spreads are associated with an increase
in volume for liquid stocks and a decrease for illiquid stocks. Our interpretation is that
when the market for liquidity is tight, banks or investors choose to sell assets for which
the price impact would be the least. That it is selling pressure that is behind the volume
effect we have documented is corroborated by the negative returns on high spread days.
4.2 Regression Analysis
To further test the hypothesis that highly liquid (illiquid) stocks experience a relative
increase (decrease) in volume as the interbank market gets increasingly tight, we run a
Fama-MacBeth two step regression procedure as follows:
First, we run the following cross-sectional regression for each month, m:
HSV OLG,m − LSV OLG,m = αm + βm × ILLIQG,m−1 + εG,m (2)
where HSV OLG,m−LSV OLG,m is the difference in normalized share volume between high
and low spread days in month m for illiquidity group G, and ILLIQG,m−1 is the average
ILLIQ across stocks in the group in month m− 1.
Second, we average the coefficients from the monthly regressions. These averages are
reported in Table 8, with Newey-West (1987) (3 lags) t-statistics.
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This procedure is run separately for the Libor-OIS and TED spreads. And to examine
robustness to the financial crisis, separate runs are done with and without the crisis.
Consistent with our theoretical framework, the coefficient on ILLIQG is negative regardless
of which specification we look at.16 More specifically, the results are as follows:
Specification (1), TED spread: The coefficient on ILLIQG is -0.0042 and is statistically
significant at the 1% level. In terms of economic significance, going from the 25th to
75th percentile of ILLIQG leads to a decrease in the difference in normalized share volume
between high and low spread days of 0.78%. This represents a reduction of 48.41% relative
to the unconditional (pooled) mean difference in normalized share volume between low and
high spread days. Using the TED spread over the Libor-OIS sample period [Specification
(3)], reduces statistical significance slightly, but boosts economic impact: Going from the
25th to 75th percentile of ILLIQG now reduces the difference in normalized share volume
between high and low spread days of 59.75% relative to the unconditional mean.
Specification (2), Libor-OIS spread: The coefficient on ILLIQG is -0.015 and is statis-
tically significant at the 10% level. Going from the 25th to 75th percentile of ILLIQG leads
to a decrease in the difference in normalized share volume between high and low spread
days of 30.53% relative to the unconditional mean.
Specification (4), TED spread, pre July 2007: The coefficient and t-statistic on ILLIQG
are almost identical to those in Specification (1).
Specification (5), Libor-OIS spread, pre July 2007: The coefficient on ILLIQG is now
-0.0168, which is slightly larger (in absolute value) as compared with the results when the
full sample period is used [Specification (2)]. Surprisingly, statistical significance is very
much improved – with the t-statistic going from -1.80 when the crisis is included to -2.79
without the crisis. This illustrates that the relation we have uncovered between changes
in the price of liquidity and abnormal volume of highly liquid vs. illiquid stocks is not a
16We have also run the regressions in Table 8 using a truncated ILLIQ measure, along the lines of
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), as follows: ILLIQij,trunc = min(0.25+0.3×ILLIQij , 30). This strengthens
the results both in terms of statistical and economic significance.
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crisis phenomenon. Instead, that the state of the interbank market influences activity in
the broader financial markets appears to be a fundamental and regular phenomenon.
In sum, the regression results in Table 8 confirm the findings in Tables 6 and 7 that
an increase in the price of liquidity is associated with an increase in the volume of highly
liquid stocks as compared to less liquid stocks. In a sense, our results in this section are
even stronger than they would need to be to support the liquidity pull-back hypothesis.
While the predictions are in terms of relative volume, our findings here show that the most
liquid (illiquid) stocks have abnormally large (small) volume in an absolute sense on high
spread days.
5 Regression Analysis using Daily Observations
The focus in this section is on regressions using the group-wise market share of volume and
relative volume measures. These regressions rely on the ordinal, rather than the cardinal,
accuracy of Amihud’s ILLIQ measure. We use all days over the sample period, not just
the extreme days from each month, as in the previous section. Thus, we examine whether
an illiquidity group’s relative volume is affected on a day to day basis by variations in the
price of liquidity. According to the liquidity pull-back hypothesis, we expect a stronger
negative association between market share of volume, or relative volume, and the price of
liquidity for less liquid groups.
5.1 Market Share of Volume
For each group G, we run the following time series-regression using daily observations:
Market Share of Volume Group Gt
mean(Market Share of Volume Group G )
= α + β × spreadt + εt (3)
where spreadt is either the Libor-OIS or TED spread on date t and, as always, illiquidity
groups are formed based on individual stocks’ ILLIQ values the previous month. We
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run separate regressions for each spread. To correct for autocorrelation, the regressions
are run using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.17 So as to facilitate comparisons across
illiquidity groups, we have normalized the market share of volume for each group by its
time series average. Thus, we expect to see the slope coefficient to be inversely related to
the group number. We expect a positive regression coefficient for the group consisting of
the most liquid stocks (group number 1) and a negative coefficient for the most illiquid
stocks (number 10).
Table 9, Panel A, displays the results using the TED spread. The coefficient on the
spread is positive for the most liquid group (number 1) and negative for all other groups.
All coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the coefficient on
the spread is decreasing (almost monotonically) in the illiquidity ranking of the groups. It
is fair to say that these results are consistent with our hypothesis.
In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in the TED spread
leads to an increase in the Market Share of Volume of Group 1 of 0.93% relative to the
group’s unconditional mean. For illiquidity group 10, a one standard deviation increase
in the TED spread leads to a fall in the Market Share of Volume of Group 10 of 11.73%
relative to this group’s unconditional mean.
Panel B uses the Libor-OIS spread. The qualitative results are the same as for the TED
spread. Statistical significance is slightly lower, but economic impact is generally larger
for the Libor-OIS spread. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the Libor-OIS
leads to an increase (decrease) in the Market Share of Volume of Group 1 (Group 10) of
17We have also run OLS regressions with Newey-West (5 lags) standard errors. In the majority of cases,
this yields smaller standard errors and results that are more supportive of our hypothesis than the results
using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure that we report in Table 9. We have also run unit root tests on the
Libor-OIS and TED spreads. Using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test we reject that the Libor-OIS is
a unit root at the 5% and that the TED spread is a unit root at the 1% level. We also reject that the
Libor-OIS and TED spreads follows a unit root at the 1% level with the Zivot-Andrews (1992) test that
allows for a structural break. This tests identifies a structural break in August 2007, which is also when
visual inspection reveals a sharp increase in this spread. Details are available upon request.
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1.11% (28.35%) relative to the group’s unconditional mean.
Panel C uses the TED spread over the shorter period for which we have data on the
Libor-OIS spread. The coefficients exhibit the same pattern as in the previous two panels,
but statistical significance is spotty. That the TED spread works less well over the shorter
Libor-OIS period may reflect that the TED spread is a noisy measure of the price of
liquidity. However, the overall conclusion from Table 9 is that the volume of the most
liquid stocks relative to the volume of the market as whole is increasing in the price of
liquidity, as predicted by the liquidity pull-back hypothesis.
5.2 Relative Volume
Here, we look at the relative volume of illiquid to liquid stocks more directly by studying
the Relative Volume of Group X to Group Y variable. Paralleling the market share of
volume regressions in the previous section, the relative volume variable is normalized by
its time-series mean so as to facilitate comparison across different pairs of groups. For any
pair of groups, with X > Y (i.e. group X is the more illiquid), we estimate the following
daily time-series regression,
Relative Volume of Group X to Group Yt
mean (Relative Volume of Group X to Group Y )
= α+ β × spreadt + εt (4)
This makes a total of 45 regressions for each spread measure. All are run using the
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.18
Table 10, Panel A, reports on the 45 TED spread regressions. For each regression, we
list the coefficient on the spread and its t-statistics (in brackets). 20 of the 45 coefficients
are significantly negative. There is no instance in which a positive coefficient is statistically
significant. There is a relatively large degree of insignificance for adjacent groups, especially
among less liquid groups. However, in the regressions where Group 1 (most liquid stocks)
18We have also run OLS regressions with Newey-West (5 lags) standard errors. In the majority of cases,
this yields smaller standard errors and results that are more supportive of our hypothesis than the results
using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure that we report in Table 10. Details are available upon request.
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is in the denominator, all regression coefficients are significantly negative. Moreover, the
trend is for the coefficient to become increasingly negative as the group in the numerator
becomes more illiquid. These results are in line with the liquidity pull-back hypothesis
– relatively less liquidity is pulled back from less liquid stocks as the price of liquidity
increases.
Economic impact is the largest for the regression involving the most extreme groups,
namely numbers 10 and 1. In this case, a one standard deviation increase in the TED
spread reduces the relative volume by 13.37% as compared to the unconditional mean.
For all other ratios, the impact is below 10% of the unconditional mean. However, when
the denominator is either the volume of group 1 or group 2 (row 1 and 2 in the table) the
impacts are always above 3% relative to the unconditional mean.
Panel B reports on the same regressions using the Libor-OIS spread. We observe the
same pattern as for the TED spread, but the results are stronger. The coefficient on
the spread is now significantly negative in 39 out of 45 cases. With respect to economic
significance, a one standard deviation increase in the Libor-OIS spread now reduces the
Relative Volume of Group 10 to Group 1 by 28.75% relative to the unconditional mean.
The smallest such impact when Group 10 is in the numerator is 14.75%.
Panel C uses the TED spread over the Libor-OIS period. The results are weaker
than for the Libor-OIS spread itself. 20 out of 45 coefficients are significantly negative
and economic impact is generally reduced. These weaker results parallel our findings when
using the TED spread in the market share of volume regressions over the Libor-OIS period
in the previous subsection. Overall, are findings are supportive of the liquidity pull-back
hypothesis and that the Libor-OIS spread is a more accurate measure of tightness in the
interbank market than the TED spread.
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5.3 Panel Regressions: Normalized Share Volume
We estimate panel regressions at the individual stock level using the normalized share
volume as the dependent variable. We run two specifications (for each spread measure).
Specification (1) is:
Normalized Share Volume it =
α + β1 × spreadt × Group1,it + . . .+ β10 × spreadt × Group10,it + εit
(5)
where GroupG,it is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if stock i belongs to illiquidity
group G at date t and 0 otherwise.19 These are interacted with the spread, which as always
is either the Libor-OIS or TED spread. Group dummies allow us to examine the effect of
spreads on stocks with different levels of illiquidity without relying on the cardinal accuracy
of ILLIQ for individual stocks. Standard errors are clustered daily in all regressions. To
reduce the effect of outliers we remove observations where the normalized share volume is
larger than 5. In specification (2), we include the market normalized share volume on day
t as a control variable.
If the liquidity pull-back hypothesis holds, we should see a decreasing coefficient on the
group dummy × spread interaction variable as the group number increases (stocks become
more illiquid). However, two factors makes it potentially more difficult to see significance
in these regressions. First, the regressions are potentially more noisy because they are run
on a stock by stock basis rather than on a portfolio basis. Second, the normalized share
volume is strictly speaking a measure of abnormal volume for a given stock, rather than a
direct measure of relative volume.
Table 11, Panel A, reports on the regressions with the TED spread. The results for
specifications (1) and (2) are almost identical. The spread×group dummy is significantly
positive (at the 1% level) for groups 1 through 6 and significantly negative (at the 1%
level) for groups 8 through 10. Moreover, the coefficient is declining in the group number
(as stocks become more illiquid). This is as predicted by our hypothesis. The coefficient
19As always, groups are formed the previous calendar month.
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on Group 7 is insignificant, indicating that this is the marginal group.
The economic impacts are large. For Group 1, a one standard deviation increase in
the TED spread leads to an increase in normalized share volume of 4.18% relative to the
unconditional mean. For Group 10 a one standard deviation increase in the TED spread
leads to a decrease in volume of 9.77% which represents a 9.70% decrease relative to the
unconditional mean.
Panel B reports on the results using the Libor-OIS spread. The pattern of the results
is broadly the same as for the TED spread, with the more liquid groups (lower numbered
groups) having positive spread×group coefficients and the more illiquid groups having neg-
ative coefficients. Statistical significance is strong under specification (1), but weak, except
for the most illiquid groups, under specification (2). With respect to economic significance,
under specification (1) a one standard deviation increase in the Libor-OIS spread leads to
an increase in the normalized share volume of stocks in Group 1 by 0.99%, while for Group
10 stocks normalized share volume falls by 5.40% relative to their unconditional means.
Panel C uses the TED spread over the Libor-OIS period. The results are slightly
stronger than for the Libor-OIS spread, especially for specification (2).
All in all, the findings in this subsection support the overall message of this paper that
the price of liquidity affects volume differentially across stocks. In particular, whether we
use the TED or the Libor-OIS spread to measure the price of liquidity, we always get the
same result: an increase in the price of liquidity is associated with an increase in volume
of liquid stocks, both relative to their own recent volume history and relative to less liquid
stocks. The reverse holds for illiquid stocks.
6 Robustness
We have found that an increase in the Libor-OIS or TED spreads are associated with an
increase in the relative volume of liquid stocks. To maximize the variation in liquidity
across stocks, and thus hopefully the power of our tests, we have included stocks listed on
23
all the major exchanges, NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Sixtythree percent of our sample is
comprised of NASDAQ stocks. However, as noted by Atkins and Dyl (1997) and Anderson
and Dyl (2007), the volume of a stock that switches from NASDAQ to NYSE or AMEX
often falls. This is due to the dealer structure on NASDAQ which implies a significant
amount of transactions between dealers that is recorded as trading volume.
Could this NASDAQ volume inflation effect drive our results? For it do so, the distor-
tion in our volume measures for NASDAQ stocks would have to covary with the Libor-OIS
and TED spreads. For example, if NASDAQ stocks are less liquid, then on high spread
days we would have to see a lower NASDAQ volume inflation than on low spread days.
To see whether our results are driven by the NASDAQ volume inflation effect, we
remove all NASDAQ stocks from our dataset and redo our analysis on the reduced sample.
We focus on the relative volume regressions, as in Table 10, since these arguably represent
the most direct test of the liquidity pull-back hypothesis. For the sake of brevity, we only
report the results when using the most liquid group (number 1) in the denominator of
the relative volume measure. The regression coefficients on the spread (which here is the
Libor-OIS spread) and the corresponding t-statistics are as follows:
Numerator group: 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Spread coefficient: -0.059 -0.076 -0.070 -0.152 -0.251 -0.247 -0.160 -0.170 -0.176
t-statistic (-3.16) (-2.06) (-1.32) (-2.17) (-2.54) (-2.38) (-2.17) (-3.57) (-2.29)
These results are qualitatively very similar to those for the corresponding regressions in
Table 10. For all regressions, the coefficient on the Libor-OIS spread is negative and, with
one exception, statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficients are increasingly negative
as the group number in the numerator increases (i.e. the group becomes increasingly illiq-
uid). In terms of economic impact, a one standard deviation increase in the Libor-OIS
spread now results in a drop in the Relative Volume of Group 10 to Group 1 of 12.4% as
compared to the unconditional mean. Thus, the results are strong in terms of economic
impact as well. In conclusion, our results are robust to the exclusion of NASDAQ stocks.
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7 Conclusion
We have argued that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity
and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks.
Tightness in the interbank market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term
liquidity pull-back, which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by
levered investors. Liquidity pull-back can be thought of as involving the conversion of low
powered money (financial assets) into higher powered money. This does not increase the
stock of money in aggregate, but can increase the money balances of an individual bank.
This line of reasoning has several implications, and the body of the paper is devoted to
testing these. The implications are verified in the data.
In our empirical analysis, we measure the state of the interbank market by the Libor-
OIS and TED spreads and the broader financial markets are represented by the equity
markets. The main focus of our tests is on volume. Consistent with the liquidity pull-back
hypothesis, the broad finding is that higher Libor-OIS and TED spreads are associated
with an increase in the volume of highly liquid stocks and a decline in that of highly
illiquid stocks. This pops out of the data regardless of how we perform our tests. We have
tried four different approaches. To reduce noise, all are based on grouping stocks into 10
liquidity ordered portfolios. For the most part, our tests do not depend on the accuracy
of the absolute measure of liquidity, but on the relative ranking induced by the measure.
First, we document that the volume of a portfolio, normalized by its own volume over
the last 5 trading days, on high spread days relative to low spread days is increasing in
the degree of liquidity of the portfolio. An equal number of high and low spread days
are chosen across months, to control for time effects. Thus, the crisis does not contribute
more high spread days than a non-crisis period of the same duration. The result is also
explicitly shown to be robust to excluding the recent crisis.
Second, for each trading day, we calculate the volume of a portfolio as a percentage of
total market volume, which we term the portfolio’s market share of volume, and regress
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this on either spread. In the regressions, we normalize each portfolio’s market share of
volume on a given day by its own sample mean so that we can compare the “volume spread
betas” of different portfolios in a meaningful way. The volume spread beta is statistically
significantly positive for the most liquid portfolio and negative for all other portfolios.
More illiquid portfolios have larger negative volume spread betas, i.e., the market share of
volume declines faster for more illiquid portfolios as the spreads rise.
Third, for each trading day, we calculate the volume of a portfolio relative to that of
a more liquid portfolio and regress this on either spread. In the regressions, we normalize
each portfolio’s relative volume on a given day by the respective sample mean. The general
finding across these 45 relative volume regressions is that the relative volumes of less liquid
portfolios are decreasing in either spread. This corroborates the results from the market
share of volume regressions.
Fourth, we calculate the same normalized volume measure as in the first approach, but
now on an individual stock level and for each trading day, not just high or low spread days.
We then regress these normalized volume measures, in a panel, on either spread interacted
with portfolio dummies, to control for the liquidity of the stock. Thus, we calculate spread
betas for the different portfolios, but now using an individual stock’s volume relative to
the 5 preceding days as the independent variable. The panel structure allows us to take
into account cross-correlation in regression errors on the same day across different stocks.
This could occur, for example, if volume is particularly large or small across stocks on a
given day for reasons that are exogenous to our model. Once again, we find that spread
betas decrease in liquidity.
In addition to our finding on volume, we also document that across liquidity portfolios,
returns are decreasing on high spread days. However, the difference in return between high
and low spread days does not vary significantly across liquidity groups. This supports the
view that the marginal cost of converting financial assets to higher powered money is
equalized across assets.
The framework for thinking about money and liquidity in financial markets that we
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have outlined in this paper may be useful for understanding a number of liquidity phe-
nomena. As an example, consider the phenomenon of increased correlations during crisis
times (King and Wadhwani, 1990) and “flight to quality” (Sundaresan, 2009 p. 343). The
recent crisis supports this; nearly all major stock indices such as the S&P 500, the DAX,
the FTSE 100, and the NIKKEI fell around 40% to 50% in local currency in the August
2007 to March 2009 period. The liquidity pull-back interpretation of the flight to quality
phenomenon is that times when this happens are times when liquidity is extremely dear
or difficult to get in the interbank market. Banks therefore engage in liquidity pull-back.
Put differently, there is a (financial market) credit contraction. The conjecture is that the
worse conditions are in the interbank market, the larger are asset cross-correlations and
the stronger will flight to quality appear to be. We have presented some cursory evidence
on asset returns. Investigating this more thoroughly is an important avenue for future
research.
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Figure 1: The Libor-OIS spread (in basis points) 
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Figure 2: The Libor-OIS and the TED spreads (in basis points) 
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Figure 3: The TED spread (in basis points)  
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Notes for Figure 3: Crises Dates 
 
 
 
Dates Description of Crisis 
15 Oct 1987 - 21 Oct 1987 Black Monday / the 1987 Crash 
02 Aug 1990 – 01 Feb 1991 Iraq invasion of Kuwait followed by liberation of Kuwait 
15 Sep 1992 – 21 Sep 1992 The U.K. crashes out of the ERM 
12 May 1997 – 19 Aug 1997 The Asian financial crisis 
13 Aug 1998 – 31 Oct 1998 Russian financial crisis 
19 Aug 1998 – 01 Oct 1998 Long Term Capital Management bailout 
08 Mar 2000 – 15 Mar 2000 Dot com bubble bursts 
01 Feb 2007 – 31 Dec 2008 Subprime mortgage financial crisis  
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Appendix A: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Description of Variable 
TED spread The three month USD London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) less the three 
month T-bill rate. 
Libor-OIS spread The three month USD London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) less the three 
month USD Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate. 
normalized share volume Share volume in day t divided by the average daily share volume over the 
previous five day period. 
average normalized share volume over day t and t+1 The average of normalized share volume over day t and t+1.  
market normalized share volume  The equal-weighted average of normalized share volume over all firms 
market average normalized share volume over day t 
and t+1 
The average of market normalized share volume over day t and t+1. 
normalized dollar volume Daily dollar volume in day t divided by the average daily dollar volume over 
the previous five day period. 
average normalized dollar volume over day t and 
t+1 
The average of normalized dollar volume over day t and t+1. 
market normalized dollar volume The equally-weighted average of normalized dollar volume over all firms 
market average normalized dollar volume over day t 
and t+1 
The average of market normalized dollar volume over day t and t+1. 
market equal weighted return The daily equally-weighted return of the market. Reported in percent. 
market equal weighted return over days t and t+1 The daily two day average equally-weighted return of the market. Reported in 
percent. 
market value weighted return The daily equal weighted return of the market. Reported in percent. 
market value weighted return over days t and t+1 The daily two day average equally-weighted return of the market. Reported in 
percent. 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t
t
ij Volume
r
AverageILLIQ  t
r  is the return on day t and tVolume  is the dollar trading volume on day t 
for stock or group i. ILLIQij is the average of tr / tVolume  over all days in 
month j. Throughout the paper we report ILLIQij×106 (i.e. volume is measured 
in millions). 
ILLIQG The equally-weighted average of ILLIQij across all stocks that belong to 
illiquidity group G. 
Market Share Volume Group Gt The dollar volume of all stocks in illiquidity group G on day t divided by the 
dollar volume of all stocks in our sample. 
Relative Volume of Group X to Yt The dollar volume of all stocks in illiquidity group X divided by the dollar 
volume of all stocks in illiquidity group Y on day t. 
Holiday A dummy for holidays set such that if a holiday falls on a Friday then the 
preceding Thursday is set to 1, and if the holiday is on a Monday then the 
following Tuesday is set to 1, and if the holiday is on any other weekday then 
the day preceding and following the holiday are set to 1. This is the same 
Holiday definition as in Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the Libor-OIS and TED spreads 
 
We present descriptive statistics of the spreads used in our study. The Libor-OIS spread data covers the period 4th December 2001 to 11 November 2008. The 
TED-spread data covers the period 2nd January 1986 to 31 December 2008. Spreads are reported in basis points. We report mean, standard error, standard 
deviation, coefficient of variation, median, minimum and maximum values. We split our sample into weekdays, holidays, crisis and non-crisis days. Our spread 
variables and the dummy variable Holiday are described in Appendix A. The notes to Figure 3 lists the crisis dates. For each day of the week, the column Diff 
reports the difference between the average spread for the given day and the average of all other weekdays (e.g., for Mon, the difference between the spread on 
Mon and the spread on Tue-Fri). For Crisis (Holiday) days the Diff column reports the difference between Crisis and Non-crisis days (Holidays and Non-
Holidays). We report the t-statistics for the differences (Diff) in the last column. 
 
 
  Variable  N  Mean  Std Error Std Dev  CoV  Median  Min  Max  Diff  t‐stat 
All Days  Libor‐OIS  1716 25.80 1.01 41.74 1.62  11.75 2.51 366.33 ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐ 
  TED  5648 55.80 0.58 43.85 0.79  41.77 2.63 456.88 ‐‐‐  ‐‐‐ 
Monday  Libor‐OIS  304 26.75 2.50 43.65 1.63  12.10 5.50 360.15 1.15 0.44
  TED  983 54.59 1.39 43.43 0.80  40.25 7.00 374.88 ‐1.46 ‐0.95
Tuesday  Libor‐OIS  353 25.50 2.16 40.67 1.59  11.50 4.70 338.95 ‐0.38 ‐0.15
  TED  1173 54.83 1.26 43.19 0.79  41.00 2.63 429.50 ‐1.16 ‐0.65
Wednesday  Libor‐OIS  357 25.16 2.14 40.42 1.61  11.80 2.51 342.00 ‐0.81 ‐0.33
  TED  1183 56.28 1.29 44.29 0.79  42.50 8.00 433.00 0.62 0.43
Thursday  Libor‐OIS  352 25.77 2.24 42.05 1.63  11.70 4.61 345.85 ‐0.04 ‐0.02
  TED  1158 56.70 1.30 44.33 0.78  43.03 9.00 415.00 1.14 0.79
Friday  Libor‐OIS  350 25.96 2.26 42.36 1.63  11.71 3.29 366.33 0.20 0.08
  TEDsprd  1151 56.39 1.30 43.94 0.78  42.25 9.25 456.88 0.75 0.51
Holiday  Libor‐OIS  21 23.52 5.14 23.57 1.00  14.33 5.58 74.00 ‐2.31 ‐0.44
  TED  66 59.02 5.31 43.17 0.73  45.50 12.38 201.75 3.26 0.60
Non‐Crisis  Libor‐OIS  1273 11.34 0.10 3.62 0.32  11.00 2.51 28.40 ‐56.03 ‐17.79
  TED  4921 48.47 0.46 32.34 0.67  38.50 2.63 258.00 ‐56.89 ‐21.28
Crisis  Libor‐OIS  443 67.37 3.15 66.25 0.98  65.38 6.50 366.33 56.03 17.79
  TED  727 105.37 2.63 71.00 0.67  85.81 14.50 456.88 56.89 21.28
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Table 2:  Illiquidity group transition probabilities  
 
Each month, stocks are sorted into illiquidity deciles (1 liquid and 10 illiquid), based on ILLIQ.  The table 
reports the percentage of stocks that are in group G one month and H the next; G, H = 1 … 10. 
 
 
  Illiquidity group in month t+1 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1 89.88 9.76 0.19 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
 2 9.84 72.69 16.41 0.85 0.14 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Illiquidity 3 0.23 15.61 61.07 20.36 2.21 0.39 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.00
group 4 0.05 1.00 18.35 53.43 22.72 3.53 0.73 0.15 0.03 0.01
in month t 5 0.02 0.20 2.49 19.82 48.46 23.12 4.68 0.98 0.19 0.04
 6 0.01 0.06 0.50 3.61 19.90 45.88 23.52 5.33 1.02 0.18
 7 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.88 4.58 20.14 44.32 23.54 5.59 0.80
 8 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.24 1.18 5.25 20.39 44.20 24.33 4.35
 9 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.27 1.22 5.33 21.58 48.14 23.36
 10 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.26 0.93 4.39 21.43 72.90
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. The data covers the period 2nd January 1986 to 31st December 2008. 
We have 5,802 daily observations of the changes in volume and returns. ILLIQ refers to the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure: ( )ttij VolumerAvgILLIQ /= ,  where tr  is the return on day t of stock i and tVolume  is 
the dollar trading volume (in millions). The averaging is done across days in month j.    There are 1,243,739 
firm-month ILLIQ observations. Panel A: Descriptive statistics of the pooled sample. Panel B:  For each month, 
stocks are sorted into ten groups based on their ILLIQij, with Group 1 consisting of the 10% most liquid stocks, 
Group 10 the 10% most illiquid stocks, etc.  Descriptive statistics for each group are provided. Panel C:  
Descriptive statistics of market normalized share and dollar volume, Relative Volume of Group 10 to Group 1 
(multiplied by 103), Market Share of Volume Group 1, equally and value weighted market returns (in percent). 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of stock illiquidity 
 
Variable  N  Mean  Std Err Std Dev CoV Median Min  Max
ILLIQ 1,243,739 17.632 0.566 631.266 35.802  0.134 0.000 291,059
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of group illiquidity 
 
Variable  Group  N  Mean  Median  Std Err  Std Dev  Min  Max 
  1  124254  0.001  0.001 0.000 0.00 0.000  0.02 
  2  124381  0.008  0.005 0.000 0.01  0.000  0.07 
  3  124417  0.026  0.015  0.000 0.03  0.000  0.28 
  4  124390  0.077  0.039 0.000 0.10 0.001  0.81 
ILLIQ   5  124360  0.201  0.093 0.001 0.26  0.002  2.11 
  6  124436  0.493  0.232 0.002 0.62  0.004  4.90
  7  124424  1.190 0.612 0.004 1.42  0.010  11.69 
  8  124383  2.987  1.766 0.009 3.32  0.032  26.65
  9  124415  8.858  5.981 0.026 9.21  0.100  77.21 
  10  124279  162.601 34.435 5.648 1991.11 0.468  291,059.30
 
Panel C: Descriptive statistics of market volume and returns 
Variable  N Mean Std Err Std Dev CoV Median  Min Max
Market normalized share volume 5,802 1.007 0.002 0.162 0.160 0.998  0.264 2.318
Market normalized dollar volume 5,802 1.009 0.002 0.183 0.181 0.994  0.245 2.689
Relative Volume  Group 10  to Group 1 5,802 0.430 0.011 0.847 1.972 0.325  0.033 29.308
Market Share of Volume Group 1 5,802 0.786 0.001 0.047 0.060 0.788  0.564 0.915
Market return (equally weighted, %) 5,802 0.079 0.010 0.828 10.477 0.141  ‐10.390 10.738
Market return (value weighted, %) 5,802 0.042 0.013 1.058 25.038 0.073  ‐17.135 11.518
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix A. For all correlations except those with the Libor-OIS spread there are 5,648 daily observations from 2nd January 1986 to 
31st December 2008. The correlations with the Libor-OIS spread are based on 1,703 daily observations from 4th December 2001 to 11th November 2008. 
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Market normalized share volume 1 0.85 0.95 0.80 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.08 
Mrkt ave. norm. share vol. day t and t+1 0.85 1 0.81 0.95 -0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.06 
Market normalized dollar volume 0.95 0.81 1 0.85 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.12 
Mrkt ave. norm. dollar vol. day t and t+1 0.80 0.95 0.85 1 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.09 
Market return (EW) -0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.01 1 0.77 0.87 0.60 -0.10 -0.17 0.02 -0.09
Market ave. return day t and t+1 (EW) 0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.03 0.77 1 0.68 0.87 -0.09 -0.18 0.02 -0.08
Market return (VW) 0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.87 0.68 1 0.71 -0.05 -0.13 0.01 -0.04
Market ave. return day t and t+1 (VW) 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.60 0.87 0.71 1 -0.03 -0.14 0.01 -0.03
TED spread 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 1 0.92 -0.09 0.22 
Libor-OIS spread 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.17 -0.18 -0.13 -0.14 0.92 1 -0.11 0.18 
Relative Volume Group 10 to Group 1 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.11 1 -0.22
Market Share of Volume Group 1 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03 0.22 0.18 -0.22 1 
 41
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of  spreads on  low and high spread days 
 
For each month in the sample period and each type of spread we: (i) select the two days with the highest and the 
two days with the lowest spreads; and (ii) average the values of the spread on the two high as well as the two 
low spread days. If there is a single highest spread day but several second highest spread days, then the latter are 
weighted equally. For example, if four days have the second highest spread for a particular month then, for that 
month, each of these four days represent one fourth of a high spread day. We proceed in the analogous way for 
low spread days. In this way, we generate time series with monthly observations of high and low spreads. The 
table provides descriptive statistics of these.  Spreads are reported in basis points. 
 
Spread  Day  N  Mean  Std Error Std Dev  CoV  Median  Min  Max 
TED spread  Low  276  43.14 2.01 33.33 0.77 32.72  6.31 252.31
  High  276  70.11 3.22 53.55 0.76 54.39  15.28 444.94
Libor‐OIS 
spread 
Low  84  21.69 3.85 35.31 1.63 10.05  3.56 243.69
High  84  33.03 5.87 53.81 1.63 13.80  7.75 363.24
TED (Libor‐
OIS period) 
Low  84  38.88 4.74 43.42 1.12 21.05  8.16 252.31
High  84  62.31 8.02 73.48 1.18 34.06  15.28 444.94
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Table 6: High and Low Spread Days: Volume and Returns by Illiquidity Group 
 
 
This table presents sorts capturing the effect of spreads on stocks of various levels of illiquidity. All of our variables are defined in Appendix A. In the month 
prior to the observation month, all of our stocks are sorted into ten groups based on ILLIQij. The stocks that are in Group 1 are the most liquid while those that 
are in Group 10 are the least liquid. We identify high and low spread days as in Table 5. For each low (high) spread day we calculate all volume measures for 
each illiquidity group. For example, for illiquidity Group 1 the normalized share volume is the total share volume of all stocks in Group 1 on day t divided by the 
average share volume of all stocks in Group 1 over the previous five day period. We then average normalized share volume over high days within each month. 
Finally, we report the average normalized share volume over all months in our sample. We follow this procedure for all four volume measures. We also report 
the equally-weighted returns of each illiquidity group. Returns (in percent) are first averaged over low (high) days within the month and then over all months in 
sample. In Panel A high and low spread days are classified according to the Libor-OIS. In Panel B we follow the exactly same procedure, but use the TED spread 
to classify high and low days. 
 
Panel A: The Libor-OIS spread 
 
 
Libor‐OIS    ILLIQUIDITY    
 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 8 9 10 Diff 1‐10 t‐stat
 
 
 
Low 
 
Normalized share volume  0.999 1.010 1.012 1.028 1.030  1.053 1.035 1.037 1.060 1.090 ‐0.091 ‐2.34
Norm. share vol. day t and t+1 1.004 1.015 1.014 1.022 1.041  1.043 1.040 1.040 1.054 1.121 ‐0.117 ‐2.67
Normalized dollar volume  1.006 1.010 1.010 1.024 1.028  1.019 1.020 1.012 1.039 1.154 ‐0.148 ‐1.64
Norm. dollar vol. day t and t+1 1.011 1.016 1.013 1.024 1.038  1.023 1.031 1.017 1.048 1.144 ‐0.134 ‐1.99
Return (EW)  0.176 0.204 0.237 0.240 0.242  0.267 0.244 0.203 0.234 0.328 ‐0.152 ‐1.26
  Return day t and t+1 (EW)  0.045 0.052 0.093 0.106 0.114  0.140 0.166 0.142 0.182 0.310 ‐0.265 ‐2.69
 
 
 
High 
 
Normalized share volume  1.058b 1.052 1.056c 1.044 1.058  1.093 1.128 1.037 1.031 0.933a 0.125 3.76
Norm. share vol. day t and t+1 1.047c 1.042 1.051 1.045 1.052  1.075 1.094 1.031 1.021 0.975a 0.072 1.96
Normalized dollar volume  1.054b 1.049 1.045 1.034 1.041  1.071 1.091 1.046 1.087 0.922b 0.132 2.95
Norm. dollar vol. day t and t+1 1.044 1.041 1.040 1.032 1.031  1.048 1.065 1.035 1.076 0.954b 0.089 2.01
Return (EW)  ‐0.048 ‐0.041 ‐0.073c ‐0.047c ‐0.081c  ‐0.036c 0.016 ‐0.016c 0.019c 0.176c ‐0.225 ‐1.83
  Return day t and t+1 (EW)  0.081 0.080 0.042 0.043 0.026  0.057 0.060 0.037 0.058 0.169 ‐0.089 ‐0.86
 
 
a, b and c denotes statistical significance between in the difference in the variable between high and low spread days at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Panel B: The TED spread  
 
 
 
 
TED 
  ILLIQUIDITY    
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 10 Diff 1‐10 t‐stat
 
 
 
Low 
 
Normalized share volume  1.004 1.012 1.009 1.014 1.016 1.024 1.013  1.021 1.024 1.033 ‐0.030 ‐1.72
Norm. share vol. day t and t+1  1.016 1.025 1.022 1.020 1.022 1.033 1.016  1.022 1.028 1.039 ‐0.022 ‐1.33
Normalized dollar volume  1.005 1.013 1.010 1.014 1.018 1.019 1.008  1.010 1.022 1.021 ‐0.016 ‐0.77
Norm. dollar vol. day t and t+1  1.017 1.024 1.023 1.020 1.026 1.027 1.013  1.017 1.031 1.035 ‐0.018 ‐0.85
Return (EW)  0.107 0.126 0.132 0.135 0.133 0.138 0.109  0.120 0.163 0.369 ‐0.262 ‐4.14
  Return day t and t+1 (EW)  0.038 0.043 0.061 0.062 0.061 0.073 0.079  0.096 0.152 0.385 ‐0.348 ‐6.37
 
 
 
High 
 
 
Normalized share volume  1.052a 1.041b 1.034c 1.032 1.038 1.034 1.040  1.028 1.036 0.997c 0.056 3.22
Norm. share vol. day t and t+1  1.035 1.029 1.023 1.031 1.034 1.038 1.032  1.024 1.032 1.003 0.032 1.75
Normalized dollar volume  1.050a 1.040b 1.029 1.031 1.035 1.035 1.044  1.052c 1.036 1.004 0.046 2.29
Norm. dollar vol. day t and t+1  1.035 1.028 1.021 1.027 1.036 1.034 1.031  1.048 1.022 1.042 ‐0.007 ‐0.18
Return (EW)  0.004 0.002 ‐0.006 0.001 ‐0.013 ‐0.014 0.016  0.049 0.089 0.359 ‐0.355 ‐4.42
  Return day t and t+1 (EW)  0.119 0.124 0.109 0.108 0.086c 0.078c 0.090c  0.087 0.118 0.391 ‐0.272 ‐4.71
 
 
a, b and c denotes statistical significance between in the difference in the variable between high and low spread days at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 44
Table 7: Differences in Volume and Returns between High and Low Spread Days 
 
We present results of the difference in changes in volume between high and low spread days over illiquidity groups. All of our variables are defined in Appendix 
A. In the month prior to the observation month, all of our stocks are sorted into ten groups based on ILLIQij. We identify high and low spread days as in Table 5. 
We calculate our volume and return measures for high and low spread days separately as described in Table 6. For each month we average our measures over all 
low (high) days. We then subtract the average value of the measure on low days from the average value of the measure on high days over all sample months. 
Finally, we report the monthly average difference between high and low spread days for our measure. In Panel A high and low spread days are classified 
according to the Libor-OIS. In Panel B we follow the exactly same procedure, but use the TED spread to classify high and low days. Returns are in percent. 
 
Panel A: Libor-OIS spread 
 
  ILLIQUIDITY    
High spread – Low spread 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 10 Diff 1 ‐10 t‐stat
Normalized share volume  0.059b 0.042 0.044c 0.016 0.027 0.039 0.093  ‐0.001 ‐0.029 ‐0.157a 0.216 4.04
Norm. share volume (t, t+1)  0.043c 0.027 0.037 0.023 0.011 0.032 0.054  ‐0.008 ‐0.033 ‐0.146a 0.189 3.26
Normalized dollar volume  0.048b 0.039 0.035 0.010 0.012 0.052 0.071  0.034 0.047 ‐0.232b 0.280 2.81
Norm. Dollar Volume (t, t+1)  0.033 0.024 0.027 0.008 ‐0.008 0.025 0.035  0.017 0.027 ‐0.190b 0.223 2.69
Return EW  ‐0.224 ‐0.245 ‐0.310c ‐0.287c ‐0.323c ‐0.304c ‐0.228  ‐0.219c ‐0.215c ‐0.152c ‐0.072 ‐0.39
Return EW (t,t+1)  0.036 0.028 ‐0.051 ‐0.063 ‐0.088 ‐0.083 ‐0.106  ‐0.104 ‐0.125 ‐0.141 0.177 1.17
 
Panel B: TED spread 
 
 
  ILLIQUIDITY    
High spread – Low spread 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 10 Diff 1 ‐10 t‐stat
Normalized share volume  0.049a 0.029b 0.024c 0.017 0.022 0.011 0.027  0.007 0.012 ‐0.037 0.086 3.28
Norm. share volume (t, t+1)  0.019 0.004 0.001 0.010 0.012 0.005 0.016  0.003 0.004 ‐0.036 0.055 2.04
Normalized dollar volume  0.046a 0.027b 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.036  0.042c 0.014 ‐0.017 0.062 2.03
Norm. Dollar Volume (t, t+1)  0.018 0.004 ‐0.002 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.018  0.031 ‐0.009 0.007 0.011 0.23
Return EW  ‐0.103 ‐0.124 ‐0.138 ‐0.133 ‐0.146 ‐0.152 ‐0.093  ‐0.071 ‐0.074 ‐0.010 ‐0.093 ‐0.97
Return EW (t,t+1)  0.081 0.080 0.048 0.046 0.025c 0.005c 0.012c  ‐0.009 ‐0.034 0.006 0.076 1.06
 
 45
Table 8: Regression analysis: Differences in Changes in Volume and Illiquidity 
 
This table documents the relation between the differences in normalized share volume between low and high 
spread days and illiquidity. All of our variables are defined in Appendix A. High and low spread days are 
classified as in Table 5. We split our sample into ten groups based on ILLIQij in the previous month. Our 
dependent variable is the monthly difference in normalized share volume between low and high spread days for 
each illiquidity group. We calculate the monthly mean normalized share volume for high and low days as in 
Table 6. For each month and illiquidity group, we then subtract the mean normalized share volume on low days 
from the mean normalized share volume on high days to get our dependent variable (HSVOLG,m-LSVOLG,m). 
Subscripts G and m refer to illiquidity group and month respectively. Our independent variable is ILLIQG,m-1, 
the mean ILLIQ for illiquidity group G in month m-1. For each month m in our sample we estimate the 
following cross-sectional regression: 
 
HSVOLG,m - LSVOLG,m=αm+βm×ILLIQG,m-1+εG,m 
 
We report the average of all the cross-sectional coefficient estimates (αm, βm) with corresponding t-statistics. 
Standard errors are estimated using the Newey-West procedure with three lags. In specification (1) we use the 
TED spread as the basis for high and low spread. Specification (2) is identical to specification (1) except that we 
use the Libor-OIS spread to identify high and low spread days. Specification (3) uses the TED spread, but 
considers the time period for which the Libor-OIS is available. Specifications (4) and (5) use the TED and 
Libor-OIS spread respectively, but consider the period prior to the financial crisis (07/2007). 
 
Illiquidity and the difference in normalized volume on high and low spread days 
 
Spread / Period  Intercept t‐stat  ILLIQG  t‐stat  Adj. R
2  N 
(1) TED   0.023  (1.91)  ‐0.0042 (‐2.28)  14.28%  275
(2) LIBOR‐OIS  0.034  (1.14)  ‐0.0150 (‐1.80)  18.07%  83 
(3) TED (OIS‐period)  0.019  (0.76)  ‐0.0125 (‐2.21)  20.30%  83 
(4) TED (pre 07/2007)  0.019  (1.71)  ‐0.0040 (‐2.05)  13.70%  257
(5) LIBOR‐OIS (pre 07/2007) 0.026  (0.80)  ‐0.0168 (‐2.79)  16.49%  66 
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Table 9: Market share of volume and spreads 
 
We investigate the relation between the market share of volume of each  illiquidity group and the TED and 
Libor-OIS spreads. We divide the market share volume of each illiquidity group by its time-series average to 
facilitate comparison between groups. Specifications (1) to (10) estimate the following daily time-series 
regression: 
 
ttspread
t εβα +×+= 
G) Group Volume of Share(Market mean 
G Group Volume of ShareMarket 
 
 
where G refers to illiquidity group G. Estimation is performed using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. In Panel A 
we use the TED spread as our independent variable. Panel B is identical to Panel A except that we consider the 
Libor-OIS spread as the independent variable. In Panel C we use the TED spread, but consider the period for 
which the Libor-OIS spread is available. Spreads are measured in percentage points. 
 
Panel A: Market share of volume and the TED spread 
 
Dependent Variable 
Market share of: 
Intercept t-stat  Spread t-stat  Adj. R2 N 
Group 1 1.002 (233.61)  0.0214 (5.47)  0.51% 5647 
Group 2 1.001 (96.36)  -0.062 (-5.11)  0.44% 5647 
Group 3 1.002 (60.07)  -0.085 (-4.96)  0.42% 5647 
Group 4 0.987 (42.71)  -0.090 (-4.23)  0.30% 5647 
Group 5 0.977 (41.53)  -0.1143 (-4.38)  0.32% 5647 
Group 6 0.965 (41.38)  -0.1347 (-4.67)  0.37% 5647 
Group 7 0.966 (38.02)  -0.1605 (-5.07)  0.44% 5647 
Group 8 0.940 (31.76)  -0.1449 (-3.93)  0.25% 5647 
Group 9 0.939 (23.17)  -0.1378 (-2.60)  0.10% 5647 
Group 10 0.982 (15.36)  -0.2288 (-2.64)  0.11% 5647 
 
Panel B: Market share of volume and the Libor-OIS spread 
 
Dependent Variable 
Market share of: 
Intercept t-stat  Spread t-stat  Adj. R2 N 
Group 1 0.961 (144.92)  0.0263 (2.51)  0.31% 1702 
Group 2 1.092 (91.64)  -0.0250 (-1.11)  0.01% 1702 
Group 3 1.200 (55.26)  -0.1079 (-2.74)  0.38% 1702 
Group 4 1.262 (33.95)  -0.1932 (-3.10)  0.50% 1702 
Group 5 1.177 (25.30)  -0.1642 (-2.11)  0.20% 1702 
Group 6 1.096 (27.15)  -0.2487 (-3.28)  0.57% 1702 
Group7 0.946 (25.55)  -0.2826 (-3.95)  0.85% 1702 
Group 8 0.774 (22.81)  -0.2865 (-4.39)  1.06% 1702 
Group 9 0.778 (12.31)  -0.3113 (-2.47)  0.30% 1702 
Group 10 1.064 (6.70)  -0.6250 (-1.96)  0.17% 1702 
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Panel C: Market share of volume and the TED spread over the Libor-OIS period 
 
Dependent Variable 
Market share of: 
Intercept t-stat  Spread t-stat  Adj. R2 N 
Group 1 0.965 (138.98)  0.0057 (0.93)  -0.01% 1702 
Group 2 1.082 (86.01)  0.0078 (0.53)  -0.04% 1702 
Group 3 1.180 (50.19)  -0.0168 (-0.67)  -0.03% 1702 
Group 4 1.236 (30.95)  -0.0484 (-1.29)  0.04% 1702 
Group 5 1.157 (23.34)  -0.0473 (-1.01)  0.00% 1702 
Group 6 1.060 (23.53)  -0.0565 (-1.11)  0.01% 1702 
Group 7 0.922 (21.93)  -0.1000 (-2.00)  0.18% 1702 
Group 8 0.761 (20.03)  -0.1250 (-2.79)  0.40% 1702 
Group 9 0.765 (10.98)  -0.1394 (-1.58)  0.09% 1702 
Group 10 1.076 (6.17)  -0.3550 (-1.59)  0.09% 1702 
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Table 10: Relative volume of illiquidity groups and spreads 
 
We investigate the relation between the relative volume (Relative Volume of Group X to Group Yt, defined in 
Appendix A) and the TED and Libor-OIS spreads. We divide relative volume by its time-series average to 
facilitate comparison between specifications. We estimate the following daily time-series regression:  
 
ttspread εβα +×+= Y) Group  toX Group of Volume (Relativemean 
tY Group  toX Group of Volume Relative  
 
where X and Y refer to illiquidity groups, X > Y. We use the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. In Panel A we report 
the estimates of β when using the TED spread as our independent variable with corresponding t-statistics in 
brackets below. Each cell reports β for the relative volume of different ILLIQ groups. Columns refer to the 
group of the numerator and rows refer to the group of the denominator (e.g., the upper leftmost cell reports 
results for when Relative Volume of Group 2 to 1 is the dependent variable). Panel B is identical to Panel A 
except that we consider the Libor-OIS spread as independent variable. Panel C considers the TED spread over 
the same period that the Libor-OIS spread is available. Spreads are measured in percentage points. 
 
Panel A: The impact of the TED spread on relative volume 
 
    Group of numerator 
G
ro
up
 o
f d
en
om
in
at
or
 
  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1  ‐0.084 
(‐5.18) 
‐0.103 
(‐4.75) 
‐0.109 
(‐4.11) 
‐0.138 
(‐4.28) 
‐0. 177 
(‐4.91) 
‐0.205 
(‐5.28) 
‐0.192 
(‐4.32) 
‐0.188 
(‐3.00) 
‐0.297 
(‐2.80) 
2 
 
‐0.073 
(‐7.50) 
‐0.080 
 (‐4.69) 
‐0.106 
(‐4.77) 
‐0.111 
(‐4.17) 
‐0.125 
(‐3.78) 
‐0.098 
(‐2.37) 
‐0.078 
(‐1.32) 
‐0.171 
(‐1.97) 
3 
   
‐0.041 
(‐4.23) 
‐0.044 
(‐2.70) 
‐0.047 
(‐2.15) 
‐0.059 
(‐1.99) 
‐0.034 
(‐0.85) 
‐0.007 
(‐0.12) 
‐0.063 
(‐0.83) 
4 
     
0.005 
(0.42) 
‐0.007 
(‐0.38) 
‐0.016 
(‐0.57) 
0.011 
(0.29) 
0.032 
(0.59) 
‐0.000 
(‐0.00) 
5 
       
‐0.005 
(‐0.39) 
‐0.003 
(‐0.15) 
0.031 
(0.99) 
0.056 
(1.17) 
0.015 
(0.22) 
6 
         
‐0.001 
(‐0.09) 
0.031 
(1.14) 
0.044 
(0.99) 
‐0.011 
(‐0.18) 
7 
           
0.018 
(0.89) 
0.021 
(0.57) 
‐0.064 
(‐0.99) 
8 
             
0.011 
(0.36) 
‐0.087 
(‐1.27) 
9 
               
‐0.116 
(‐1.35) 
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Panel B: The impact of the Libor-OIS spread on the relative volume 
 
    Group of numerator 
G
ro
up
 o
f d
en
om
in
at
or
 
  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1  ‐0.063 
(‐1.84) 
‐0.154 
(‐2.92) 
‐0.255 
(‐3.28) 
‐0.239 
(‐2.53) 
‐0.326 
(‐3.61) 
‐0.362 
(‐4.23) 
‐0.362 
(‐4.52) 
‐0.382 
(‐2.52) 
‐0.746 
(‐1.95) 
2 
 
‐0.081 
(‐4.66) 
‐0.157 
 (‐3.74) 
‐0.140 
(‐2.19) 
‐0.224 
(‐3.38) 
‐0.268 
(‐4.14) 
‐0.283 
(‐4.49) 
‐0.304 
(‐2.35) 
‐0.609 
(‐1.99) 
3 
   
‐0.073 
(‐3.21) 
‐0.073 
(‐1.62) 
‐0.143 
(‐2.85) 
‐0.195 
(‐3.78) 
‐0.217 
(‐4.35) 
‐0.234 
(‐2.25) 
‐0.511 
(‐1.97) 
4 
     
‐0.028 
(‐1.34) 
‐0.085 
(‐2.75) 
‐0.148 
(‐4.17) 
‐0.174 
(‐4.68) 
‐0.190 
(‐2.23) 
‐0.437 
(‐1.87) 
5 
       
‐0.067 
(‐3.98) 
‐0.144 
(‐5.29) 
‐0.176 
(‐5.28) 
‐0.190 
(‐2.49) 
‐0.438 
(‐1.97) 
6 
         
‐0.111 
(‐4.70) 
‐0.157 
(‐4.81) 
‐0.174 
(‐2.15) 
‐0.437 
(‐2.06) 
7 
           
‐0.101 
(‐2.68) 
‐0.130 
(‐1.58) 
‐0.450 
(‐1.97) 
8 
             
‐0.049 
(‐0.73) 
‐0.427 
(‐1.69) 
9 
               
‐0.411 
(‐1.29) 
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Panel C: The impact of the TED on the relative volume during the Libor-OIS period 
 
    Group of numerator 
G
ro
up
 o
f d
en
om
in
at
or
 
  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1  ‐0.002 
(‐0.08) 
‐0.028 
(‐0.80) 
‐0.065 
(‐1.33) 
‐0.064 
(‐1.06) 
‐0.076 
(‐1.19) 
‐0.130 
(‐2.09) 
‐0.157 
(‐2.79) 
‐0.174 
(‐1.61) 
‐0.431 
(‐1.58) 
2 
 
‐0.027 
(‐2.05) 
‐0.043 
 (‐1.51) 
‐0.039 
(‐0.98) 
‐0.056 
(‐1.24) 
‐0.103 
(‐2.23) 
‐0.133 
(‐3.01) 
‐0.144 
(‐1.56) 
‐0.360 
(‐1.64) 
3 
   
‐0.021 
(‐1.30) 
‐0.022 
(‐0.77) 
‐0.035 
(‐1.03) 
‐0.081 
(‐2.22) 
‐0.114 
(‐3.26) 
‐0.115 
(‐1.55) 
‐0.314 
(‐1.68) 
4 
     
0.006 
(0.44) 
‐0.011 
(‐0.53) 
‐0.065 
(‐2.51) 
‐0.103 
(‐3.86) 
‐0.100 
(‐1.64) 
‐0.267 
(‐1.60) 
5 
       
‐0.019 
(‐1.52) 
‐0.082 
(‐4.03) 
‐0.121 
(‐5.12) 
‐0.113 
(‐2.07) 
‐0.279 
(‐1.75) 
6 
         
‐0.081 
(‐4.71) 
‐0.130 
(‐5.67) 
‐0.115 
(‐2.00) 
‐0.302 
(‐1.99) 
7 
           
‐0.096 
(‐3.61) 
‐0.092 
(‐1.57) 
‐0.320 
(‐1.94) 
8 
             
‐0.018 
(‐0.37) 
‐0.276 
(‐1.53) 
9 
               
‐0.263 
(‐1.16) 
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Table 11: Regression analysis: Spreads, Illiquidity and Individual Stock Volume  
 
We examine the relation between spreads, illiquidity and individual stock volume. All of our variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Our dependent variable is daily normalized share volume at the stock level. We remove 
observations with normalized share volume greater than five. Group1 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 
if a stock belongs to illiquidity Group 1 (i.e., the bottom ten percent in terms of illiquidity), 0 otherwise. Group2 
to Group10 are dummy variables that take the value 1 if a stock belongs to that liquidity group. Our main 
independent variables are the Libor-OIS and the TED spread interacted with the illiquidity dummy variable, i.e., 
spread×Group1 ,…, spread×Group10. We estimate the following pooled panel regression: 
 
normalized share volumeit=α+β1×spreadt×Group1,it+…+β10× spreadt× Group10,it+εit 
 
where i refers to firm and t refers to day. Groups are formed the previous calendar month. In some 
specifications we use as a control variable the market normalized share volume. Standard errors are clustered 
around time. In Panel A we use the TED spread as spread variable, in Panel B we consider the Libor-OIS and in 
Panel C we consider the TED spread over the Libor-OIS period. Spreads are measured in percentage points. 
 
Panel A: The TED spread 
 (1)  (2) 
 estimate t-stat  estimate t-stat 
intercept 0.967  (304.37)   0.9677 (289.77) 
MRKT NORM. SHARE VOL. ‐‐  ‐‐    ‐0.0004 (‐0.70) 
spread×Group1 0.0959 (15.31)    0.0960 (15.29) 
spread×Group2 0.0977 (16.38)    0.0979 (16.35) 
spread×Group3 0.0856 (14.14)    0.0858 (14.12) 
spread×Group4 0.0726 (12.00)    0.0728 (11.98) 
spread×Group5 0.0543 (9.06)    0.0544 (9.05) 
spread×Group6 0.0319 (5.32)    0.0321 (5.32) 
spread×Group7 0.0027 (0.47)    0.0029 (0.49) 
spread×Group8 ‐0.0422 (‐7.46)    ‐0.0421 (‐7.42) 
spread×Group9 ‐0.1065 (‐17.53)   ‐0.1064 (‐17.50) 
spread×Group10 ‐0.2229 (‐29.61)   ‐0.2228 (‐29.61) 
          
Clustering  Time 
0.55% 
24,429,664 
  Time 
0.55% 
24,429,664 
Adj R2   
N   
 
 52
Panel B: The Libor-OIS spread 
 (1)  (2) 
 estimate t-stat  estimate t-stat 
intercept 1.0121 (257.52)   0.8675 (22.50) 
MRKT NORM. SHARE VOL. ‐‐  ‐‐    0.1055 (3.71) 
spread×Group1 0.0240 (1.94)    0.0130 (1.16) 
spread×Group2 0.0269 (2.21)    0.0159 (1.46) 
spread×Group3 0.0271 (2.09)    0.0163 (1.41) 
spread×Group4 0.0291 (2.21)    0.0183 (1.56) 
spread×Group5 0.0297 (2.21)    0.0189 (1.59) 
spread×Group6 0.0239 (1.71)    0.0133 (1.06) 
spread×Group7 0.0148 (1.10)    0.0043 (0.36) 
spread×Group8 ‐0.0082 (‐0.70)    ‐0.0188 (‐1.75) 
spread×Group9 ‐0.0421 (‐3.62)    ‐0.0526 (‐4.59) 
spread×Group10 ‐0.1303 (‐8.61)    ‐0.1406 (‐8.85) 
          
Clustering  Time 
0.087% 
6,333,758 
  Time 
0.54% 
6,333,758 
Adj R2   
N   
 
Panel C: The TED spread over the Libor-OIS period 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 estimate t-stat  estimate t-stat 
intercept 1.0105 (218.47)   0.8682 (22.55) 
MRKT NORM. SHARE VOL. ‐‐  ‐‐    0.1040 (3.69) 
spread×Group1 0.0242 (2.73)    0.0177 (2.21) 
spread×Group2 0.0257 (2.92)    0.0191 (2.43) 
spread×Group3 0.0260 (2.73)    0.0195 (2.30) 
spread×Group4 0.0277 (2.78)    0.0212 (2.38) 
spread×Group5 0.0271 (2.64)    0.0208 (2.26) 
spread×Group6 0.0240 (2.25)    0.0177 (1.85) 
spread×Group7 0.0170 (1.72)    0.0109 (1.22) 
spread×Group8 0.0021 (0.25)    ‐0.0042 (‐0.56) 
spread×Group9 ‐0.0265 (‐3.29)    ‐0.0327 (‐4.35) 
spread×Group10 ‐0.0931 (‐10.14)   ‐0.0992 (‐11.07) 
          
Clustering  Time 
0.12% 
6,286,269 
  Time 
0.56% 
6,286,269 
Adj R2   
N   
 
 
 
 
